by

Max Riedlsperger (Cal Poly State University SLO)

Prepared for the the 1999 meeting of the German Studies Association

Atlanta, Ga. 8. October 1999

Introduction

The title of this paper and the question posed by this magazine cover refer to FPÖ-Chairman Jörg Haider's claim that he should be elected head of government (Landeshauptmann) in Carinthia if his party were to capture a relative majority in the 7. March Landtagswahl. Simply the fact that Austria's leading newsmagazine would pose the question indicates the controversy surrounding his person. For most of Austria's literati, artists and intellectuals, the answer to the question on the cover of profil was clearly no! As Jennifer Michaels will note in her paper to follow, "there is little love lost between contemporary Austrian writers and Jörg Haider," and, I might add, the feeling is mutual. The reasons are too complex to be explored in any depth here, but some of them lie in deep and contentious differences over history and the way in which Austrian identity is perceived. The observations of the Trieste Germanist Claudio Magris are to the point. Writers, according to Magris, have embraced the idea of a "hinternational" Central Europe, "nowadays idealized as the harmony between different peoples … of the Habsburg Empire, a tolerant association of peoples understandably lamented when it was over …." While recognizing a certain legitimacy in this view, he notes that it was rooted in myth:

This latter view, of itself, is not racist, but it does see German culture as central to the integration, civilization and perpetuation of ethics and values for Central Europe. Following the collapse of the old Habsburg Empire in 1918, virtually all the political and cultural elites saw Austria as a part of the cultural German nation even if the victorious Allies prohibited the realization of a true, "greater German" nation-state. Even the Nazi take-over of Germany did not end this view. Some simply saw Austria as the „better" German state, while others longed for inclusion in the „greater German Reich." The experiences between the Anschluss in 1938 and 1945 ended any illusions or desires for unity within a political German nation, but as late as 1956, the first poll on the question of identity showed 46 per cent identifying Austrians as part of the German ethnic, linguistic and cultural cultural community.

The general ideological conflict described by Magris describes one of the fundamental reasons for the antipathy between the contemporary Austrian literary community and Haider. For writers, the "hinternational" is now the multicultural view while those of Haider and his FPÖ are contemporary iterations of the Austro-German outlook. Many of today’s literary elite are of the student generation that revolted against the "Establishment" represented by the government of ÖVP-Chancellor Josef Klaus (1966-1979). To be Left and radical was chic, and the 68-er reveled in their " anti-Establishment" status as a kind of political "Other." In 1970, however, came a major transition, when Socialist Party-Chairman Bruno Kreisky became Chancellor. Kreisky was a darling of the 68-ers. To be sure, he was not of their generation, but as a Jew, even if one who had declared this inconsequential, and as a fighter against the "clerical-fascist" government of the 1930's and then a refugee from Nazism, Kreisky personified "the Other," both ethnically and politically. Under Kreisky, some of the 68-er became apprentice politicians while their friends took up junior positions in the schools, universities and the media and began their "march through the institutions" of the society. This was the "golden Age" of the Second Republic with a prosperity that afforded social-welfare benefits for everyone, including a rich and heavily subsidized cultural life. Many of the writers, artists and intellectuals who benefited, extrapolated, from what Magris describes as the "idealized harmony" of the Habsburg Empire, a model for the Second Republic that would be elevated and enriched by the contributions of the new "Other" who immigrated into what had been a largely German Austria. This pedagogic goal is described in an article in this year's Contemporary Austrian Studies as a manifestation of the motives of Kreisky and the Linksintellektuellen who rose to prominence under his leadership and the unbroken string of Socialist Chancellors who have succeeded him. Expressing the Austro-Marxist concepts of the 1930's,

One of the goals of these writers-as-pedagogs was to end the myth of Austria as the victim of "Hitlerite aggression" as proclaimed by the expedient 1943 Moscow Declaration of the Allies and to force Austrians to acknowledge the factors that had led them into enthusiastic support for National Socialism and made them its willing agents. Without question, one of the most important factors had been the goal of Anschluß as a means of completing German national unification. While no one any longer expressed this hope, there were those who still insisted that they were part of the German ethnic, linguistic and cultural community. These problematic Austrians have been portrayed by modern writers as reactionary provincials, nostalgic Nazis and neo-fascist right-wing extremists. A recent example of this attitude that has now become known as "antifa" is Wiener Blut, chosen by Burgtheater Director Claus Peymann as one of his last shots against the philistines of Vienna. In the words of the playwrite Johann Kresnik: "Just a bunch of murderers, suicides and people in despair who don't know what they are supposed to do. That is Austria. That is Wiener Blut."

For the Linksintellektuellen, whether in politics, academia, the media, literature or the arts, Haider is a right-extremist whose success is rooted in his successful appeal to the kind of society that is portrayed by Kresnik and others. Some of the reasons are:

• The Nazi background of Haider's parents, his own early enthusiasm for German cultural nationalism and his purported nostalgia for National Socialism.
• Haider’s support for traditional (read German-Austrian) values, his antipathy towards multiculturalism and his view that immigration is one of the major causes of the decline in the civility of modern society.
• Haider’s drive to reduce the social-welfare state along with its generous subsidies to the press, literature and the performing arts, particularly the Burgtheater of Claus Peymann and the contemporary writers whose works he promoted.

In contrast, in a number of papers at GSA meetings, published articles and chapters in books, I have argued that the „Haider Phenomenon" was made possible by the erosion of the old Weltanschuung- or Lager-based political appeal with which Austrian parties had traditionally mobilized their electorates. Haider has understood how to exploit these changes and has transformed the FPÖ from a tiny German-national Lager-party that his predecessors Friedrich Peter and Norbert Steger had been trying to return to its liberal roots into a modern, radical, right-populist party at virtual numerical parity with the traditional parties that have dominated Austria since 1945.

The Haider-FPÖ is, to be sure, right -- first of all, because it is relentless in its opposition to the „Lefties" of the media and the academic, artistic and cultural "Establishment" and the „Reds" of the SPÖ. It demands a change from the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition that has stood since 1986 and the unbroken string of Socialist chancellors since 1970. It is radical in much the same sense that the U.S. Republicans were in 1994 when they touted a „New American Revolution Revolution." Haider even reworked Newt Gingrich‘s „Contract with America" as a „Contract with Austria" and studied Governor Pete Wilson‘s anti-immigration measures in California. In an essay for Contemporary Austrian Studies I explained my reasons for differentiating between what I see as the modern radical-right-populism of the FPÖ and the view that has been developed by Dokumentationsarchiv des Österreichischen Widerstandes (DÖW) which essentially contends that the Haider-FPÖ is a right-extremist reincarnation of the NSDAP. Since the DÖW position is widely accepted by the media, in academic and cultural circles as well as within the SPÖ, I was pleased to find that my view was paralleled by the eminent British historian of Austria, Peter Pulzer, in his review of the DÖW Handbuch des Österreichischen Rechtsextremismus in the same issue of Contemporary Austrian Studies where I made my case.

To be sure, Haider has made comments that give ammunition to those who portray him as a neo-Nazi, or at best as an apologist for Nazism who lacks remorse for its crimes and sensitivity for its victims. These „slips," they assume, reveal the „true Haider" who has been successful because he strikes pro-Nazi chords deep in the hearts of the many Austrians. In contrast, I believe his success has been not because of what he said, but rather because his disdain for the „political correctness" of his critics is widely shared. A substantial body of research shows that electoral support for the FPÖ has grown because it gives critical voice to modern concerns that a growing segment of the public feels have been ignored or mishandled by the „Tweedle-dum and Tweedle-dee" coalition of what Haider calls the „SPÖVP Einheitspartei. Haider is an unusally astute populist and as such is always ready to change. He is a moving target and his enemies have failed to move their sights to keep up with him. The consequence is that their continuing reminders of „slips" long past have become irrelevant and increasingly, people have come to question whether Haider's past political incorrectness is any reason to bar him from governmental responsibility. In Carinthia, this past March, voters answered the question posed by the profil cover with a convincing yes and at the same time, in elections in Tyrol and Salzburg, continued the trend in protest voting that has been charcteristic of the period since 1986.

These three election campaigns gave me my first opportunity to test my past evaluations of the party which had been based on printed sources, interviews and video against the actual behavior of FPÖ politicians in their rallies in the Gasthäuser and in their one-to-one contacts with people in the streets. I assumed that if the „antifa" critics of the FPÖ were correct, I would see evidence of right-extremism in the numerous of meetings I attended. These included a regional strategy meetings of local precinct leaders, a number of Gasthaus speeches with question-answer sessions to one large rally with over 500 in attendance. I found no evidence to compell a revision of my earlier analysis and the election results seem to have moved significant numbers of politicians and journalists to a similar position.

The Background:

Since 1989, „Super Sunday" elections have been held at five year intervals for the state parliaments in Carinthia, Salzburg and Tyrol. Given my title and the fact that the stunning FPÖ success in Carinthia gave Jörg Haider the power to organize the government and claim the prize of Landeshauptmann there, this paper will focus on that election and its immediate consequences. The other elections are, however, also important and not only because my goal was also to gain impressions about the FPÖ as a whole. Since they involve three states at one time and particularly because they are in Alpine Austria, well-removed from the dominance of Vienna, they have acquired more than just a provincial significance. They are particularly important this year as a possible harbinger of the Federal Parliament election that will take place the Sunday before this conference. For these reasons, I will begin with a short summary of the elections in Salzburg and Tyrol before turning to Carinthia. Although the circumstances in each state were different, common issues in all the campaigns were the following:

• Unemployment. Consistent with its positions on immigration and the demands to limit public spending, even before the election campaign, Haider had proposed that foreigners unemployed for more than three months be expelled from Austria.The FPÖ seized upon the report of record unemployment of among foreigners in January 1999 and made this a campaign issue in all the March elections.
• The Eastern Expansion of NATO and subsequently the EU was portrayed as a danger that would increase the problem of cheap labor and would price Austrians out of jobs.
• Rising Crime and the abuse of public assistance were blamed on illegal immigrants.
• Tax Reform proposals focused on the FPÖ plan for a flat-tax.
• Favoratism, patronage, corruption, inefficiency and the waste of tax-money have long been part of the FPÖ populist appeal. In these elections the FPÖ laid these problems at the door of governments dominated by the same parties since 1945 and loudly asserted the need for a change.

Unlike Carinthia, Salzburg and Tyrol had to do without the energetic campaigning of Haider who helped so much in 1989 and 1994. With Haider's involvement limited to the opening rallies, the media widely predicted FPÖ losses in these states.

Background:

Salzburg has always been a citadel of FPÖ support, averaging 12.77 percent of the electorate in state elections over a period when the party was barely above the 5 per cent barrier in federal elections. In the March 1989 Landtag election, the Salzburg FPÖ was an early beneficiary of the „Haider Effekt," almost doubling its voter share with a total of 16.37 per cent. In 1992, Haider carried out what has been called the „Knight of the Long Knives" against the „old guard" state leadership and won the election of his own man, Karl Schnell, a youthful, aggressive physician from Saalbach who became a willing executor of his policy of „total opposition." In 1994, the party won 19.5 per cent of the vote and for Schnell a seat in the state government under the system of proportional representation then in effect. By 1997, the FPÖ had reached 28-30 per cent in the polls giving reason to believe it might become the second largest party in the state in the 1999 election. Then, however, a crisis struck that made even stasis look optimistic by the time the campaign began. The problems started in October of 1997 when Schnell was accused of complicity in the theft of data on immigration from the computer of SPÖ-Chairman Buchleitner. Schnell had long been a thorn in the side of the SPÖ, expoiting his position to attack Chancellor Vranitzky‘s government in Vienna as well as to conduct a „muck-racking" campaign against the ÖVP leadership of Salzburg. The SPÖ had moved several votes of no-confidence to remove him, but without success. This time was different. Anticipating the need for SPÖ cooperation in the future, ÖVP-Chairman and head of government Franz Schausberger supported the SPÖ vote of no-confidence in what amounted to a coalition to expell Schnell from the government. Schnell‘s unlikely direct involvement in the petty crime was certainly not the reason. Even profil, which is usually hostile to the FPÖ, speculated that Schausberger had gone along with the SPÖ in return for its support of a his proposal for a constitutional amendment to replace proportional representation in state government with majority rule. Given the probability that the ÖVP would not win an absolute majority in the March 1999 election, Schausberger seemed clearly to be firming up relations with his likely coalition partner.

Although the case against Schnell in the computer-theft matter was dropped for lack of evidence in May, 1998, the scandal created the opportunity for an attack on his leadership. The „old guard" who wanted revenge for the 1992 purge found common cause with some members of the state parliament fraction who wanted to end Schnell‘s version of Haider‘s politics of „total opposition" and work constructively with the ÖVP. Schnell supporters go so far as to see the fine hand of the ÖVP behind the challenge. The bickering tore the party apart throughout the first nine months of 1998 making the prospects for March 1999 election look bleak. Under heavy pressure from Haider, Schnell finally resigned in April throwing the party into a virtual civil war that was resolved only when Haider sent a „Diktat" via his two „King-Cobras," Gernot Rumpold and Susanne Riess-Passer to end the crisis. Rumpold and Riess-Passer degraded all but one of the 700 party functionaries to simple party members and took over temporary control of the party themselves. „That is the beginning of the end for Jörg Haider," profil reported one disgruntled functionary to say. This, added to internal crises in Tyrol and Carinthia had already made 1998 an „annus miserabilis" for Haider when a financial scandal broke involving FPÖ member-of-parliament Peter Rosenstingl. Polls showed the FPÖ at a three year low of 21 per cent at the federal level and the fractured Salzburg party was projected to win only 17 per cent in the March 1999 election. In Salzburg, new functionaries were elected at the precinct level and preparations made for a state convention in September to restore order. In the meantime, Haider, who had been rumored to be backing one of the dissidents, returned to his support of Schnell after the latter had made his trip to Canossa at Haider's estate in the Carinthian Bärenthal. Although the dissidents continued to criticize Schnell down to the eve of the convention, most of them did not appear for the show-down on 21. September in Saalfelden. With the blessing of Jörg Haider who flew in by helicopter to dramatize his support, Schnell was reelected state party Chairman with 82.2 per cent of the vote.

The Campaign:

As in every Salzburg Landtagswahl since 1945, the issue was how large the ÖVP majority would be. Franz Schausberger had taken over as ÖVP-Chairman and head of state government in 1996, two years after his predecessor had led the party to its worst (38.6%) showing ever. In order to increase his margin of victory and therefore ÖVP strength in the coalition with the SPÖ that was widely anticipated, Schausberger tried to mobilize all anti-SPÖ voters behind the ÖVP. Raising the specter that the „Reds" might try to make a coalition with „… the blue enemy that besoils the state," he argued that a vote for the FPÖ would be wasted.

While suggesting that cooperation with the FPÖ-dissidents might be possible, he argued that a party headed by Schnell would never beallowed any governmental responsibility. In this campaign of personal smears, the FPÖ depicted Schnell as the candidate whose influence could not be bought. Schnell, with virtually no media presence, traveled through record winter snows to walk the streets and troop through butcher-shops, bakeries, stores and other businesses to make his case as the candidate of „the little man." Taking advantgage of the fact that elections for town councils were also scheduled for 7. March, Schnell piggy-backed his appearances on to rallies for local FPÖ candidates. At the rallies I observed, he was not only per-du with the local candidates, but appeared to make close personal contact with the curious who turned out. His message was everywhere the same: the permanent ÖVP government of Salzburg, now under the arrogant „Professor" Schausberger was mismanaged, wasteful and corrupt and ignored the interests of the people. The only evidence of that which the „Antifa" typically uses to impute anti-democratic or neo-Nazi characteristics to the FPÖ was the issue of foreigners. In the rally with more than 1000 in attendance that opened the campaign, Schnell echoed the Federal-FPÖ position stating „that the city and state of Salzburg do not need any new foreigners."

In the functions I attended, and these included two major Gasthaus rallies for Schnell, a forum for town council candidates, a strategy meeting of Bezirksleiter in Pinzgau and two walking tours with candidates through shoping districts, on only one occasion was the foreigner question a major issue. It arose when SPÖ candidates for the town council in Saalfelden attacked an article in an FPÖ campaign newspaper which criticized the policy they had pursued in alloting spaces in the communal Kindergarten for children below the age of five. The FPÖ article asked:

1. to the children of foreigners so that they will learn German
2. to the children of welfare recipients so that they escape their poor social millieu and are gotten off the streets
3. to the children of single monthers and only then
4. to the children of the married couples of Saalfelden."

For this, mayorial candidate Hannes Jäger was accused of anti-foreigner racism. He angrily responded that it was not he and his party that discriminated on the basis of race, but rather the SPÖ-council majority which had established the priorities. I subsequently suggested to Jäger and independently to other Gemeinderat- and Landtag-candidates that perhaps these were precisely the children who needed this kind of early-schooling the most and that this stance was strongly remenisicent of the „Austria first" initiative of 1993 that had been so widely condemned as xenophobic and racist. To a person, these candidates responded that they had nothing against the hard-working foreigners who, over the years, had integrated themselves into Austrian society. They were, however, highly critical of what they call the „SPÖVP Unity Government" in Vienna for failing to deal with the allegedly many hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants who had „submarined" into Austrian society. The legitimacy of this concern was given credibility by the figure of almost 20,000 would –be immigrants reported by the Minister of Interior to have been captured trying to illegally enter the country the previous year. Beyond this, the FPÖ exploited resentment against recent refugees who had stayed on in Austria at public expense rather return to their homes once order had been restored. A doubling of the applications for asylum produced by the crisis then developing in Kosovo added to the fact that of the 95,000 Bosnian refugees who had come to Austria, 65,000 had stayed provided immediacy to this FPÖ campaign issue. An article in the party newspaper criticized the SPÖ of a conscious policy of making Vienna into a "multicultural city of immigrants…. As a consequence, Vienna, with thirty percent, already has the highest percentage of foreigners in Europe and is losing its identity."

The foreigner issue was also near the surface in other themes of the FPÖ campaign in Salzburg as well as in the campaigns in Tyrol and Carinthia:

• Unemployment. In addition to linking the unemployment problem to foreigners, the Salzburg FPÖ charged the Schausberger regime with responsibility for 1,250 bankrupcies during his two years in office and challenged the rosy economic picture being painted by the ÖVP by contending that that real unemployment was the „highest in decades."
• The „Sell-Out" of domestic banks, businesses and industries to foreigners was reputed to have exacerbated the unemployment problem.
• The Eastern Expansion of NATO and subsequently the EU.
• Rising Crime and the abuse of public assistance were blamed on illegal immigrants while Salzburg‘s intellectural and political elites simply covered up the evidence. The danger was, the FPÖ asserted, that without knowing what was going on, the public was simply accepting a higher level of criminality.
• Other issues were consistent with the FPÖ effort to portray itself as the party to reform the excesses of the welfare-state. Schausberger was criticized for wasting money on unnecessary mega-projects, for drawing a salary that was approximately 90% of that of President Clinton, the practice of awarding highly paid jobs to political cronies, too much welfare for „social-parasites," and too little for seniors, single-mothers, families, etc. Schnell proposed that all members of the state legislature who either retired or were not returned in the election voluntarily give up their right to a separation payment. All FPÖ-candidates took a pledge to abide by this in an attempt to imply that those in the other parties who didn‘t were guilty of taking advantage of their political positions. Although not really a state issue, the party‘s flat-tax proposal was introduced in an apparent effort to start the federal parliamentary election campaign early.

At the rallies I attended, the ticket-leader for the local town council began the meeting, introduced his team and addressed the local issues. He then introduced „Charlie" Schnell" who blasted the Schausberger government using quotations from the Salzburger Nachrichten to document his points, e.g. an article about a prostitute who who been receiving welfare. In the last week of thecampaign each precinct put out a flier with its own message on the back, while on the front there appeared a picture of Schausberger and Buchleitner with SPÖ-Chancellor Klima. The text pointed out that two Salzburg candidates had engineered the expulsion of Karl Schnell from the government on bogus grounds and then amended the constitution to eliminate proportional representation in the state government. Using the picture to imply that the ÖVP and SPÖ had already agreed on a post-election coalition without bothering to wait for the decision of the voters, the flier urged Salzburg citizens to vote for Karl Schnell and his team as the only protection against this „arrogance of the mighty."

The FPÖ candidates and functionaries with whom I spoke exhibited enormous enthusiasm for „Charlie" Schnell and those who attended his rallies responded with the kind of indignation that his populist diatribe against Schausberger would be expected to elicit among those who would turn out for such an event. Among the general public, I found little enthusiasm for Schausberger and significant agreement with the FPÖ picture of him as out-of-touch and arrogant, but there seemed to be no real expectation that his ÖVP would not win the relative majority necessary to keep him at the head of government. Indeed, a Standard/Spectra poll published the week before the election projected the ÖVP at 40% with the young and dynamic team fielded by the SPÖ at a likely 30 per cent. In contrast, the FPÖ was projected to win only 16 per cent (-3.5%) and I heard much speculation that the outcome might be as low as 14 per cent. Without the usual pre-election optimism, the Salzburg FPÖ set its goal at only 20 per cent, a scant, but realistic half-point above its 1994 showing.

The results came as a modest, but pleasant surprise for the FPÖ. Although losing one seat due to changes in the electoral law, it actually improved its voter share to 19.6 per cent, its highest ever. Even if the increase was only .1 per cent, given the difficult circumstances, the outcome was considered enough of a victory to rescue Schnell from his promise to resign if he did not reach his goal --- at least for the time being. The victory for Schnell may, however, not be definitive. His critics remain in the party and appear to be just waiting for Schnell’s people in the new and difficult environment created by the end to proportional representation to make mistakes that will permit them to launch another attack. Susanne Riess-Passer, who is credited with having imposed order in Salzburg, expressed to me her feeling that the appearance of unity behind Schnell was only superficial and implied that she expects future problems with the Salzburg party. A devoted Schnell-supporter, bitter at the manner in which Riess-Passer and Rumpold on orders from Haider had handled last year‘s crisis, likewise expressed the belief that the problems between the Salzburg and Federal Party are by no means past.

Tyrol, was also an early beneficiary of the „Haider Effekt." In 1989, the FPÖ rocketed into prominance, increasing its voter-share by more than 250 per cent. Most of this gain came at the expense of the ÖVP which lost 15.91 per cent and the absolute majority in votes cast, if not in seats in the parliament, but also at the expense of the SPÖ which lost 2.5 per cent. The 1994 election saw a slight continuation in the erosion of the ÖVP and the SPÖ, but no change in power.

The major question in 1999 was whether the ÖVP would be able to continue its political dominance? Polls projected narrow margins for the ÖVP on either side of a magic number of somewhat more than the 47 per cent that would be necessary to win an absolute majority of seats in the state parliament. The major issue, cited by 41 per cent of those polled, was concern about what was now inner-EU truck traffic across Tyrol between Italy and Germany. Far behind was concern about the health of families at 21 per cent and about foreigners at 20 per cent. Here, rhethoric against the EU and its transit policy which is blamed for bespoiling the air and the tranquility of the mountain landscape has had almost as much populist appeal as the foreigner issue in Vienna. As the head of the state government, ÖVP-Chairman Governor Wendelin Weingartner had cultivated an image of opposition to the EU-transit policy and distanced himself from the treaty negotiated by the Federal Government in which the Foreign Ministry has been held by his own party since 1986. Indeed, ÖVP-Chairman-Schüssel was not even invited to participate in the campaign and from the labels on Weingartner‘s posters it would appear that he was a candidate of the Tyrolean- not the Austrian Peoples‘ Party. Weingartner‘s image as a fighter for Tyrol against Vienna and the EU made him a favorite of 58 per cent in a pre-campaign IMAS-poll, with the SPÖ candidate at 20 per cent, roughly his party‘s voter-share in the most recent elections. Franz Linser, ticket-leader of the FPÖ, was far behind at 9 per cent,probably indicative of the crisis his party had gone through the previous year.

As in Salzburg, the reasons for the 1998 crisis were complex, rooted in a traditional division between the Innsbruck party and the rest of the state, in tactical and ideological disagreements, in an organizational power vaccum and personal differences. For our purposes, they are less significant because the „fire brigade" sent out from the Federal Party in Vienna had successfully purged the dissidents and the establishment of Susanne Riess-Passer as the „chief profi" solved the organizational problems. Nevertheless, the FPÖ was not expected to improve significantly.

Among the three states electing new governments, the results were expected to have the least impact on Tyrol. Weingartner was, however, vulnurable. He did not have a personal powerbase in one of the three sub-groups which constitute the ÖVP and was under attack by the leader of its worker organization. Also, although he had long played the populist on the transit issue, against highway tolls and the like, as a banker-type, he was stiff and personally ill-suited to the role. Fixing on the unliklihood that Weingartner would be able to continue what had been the permanent ÖVP absolute majority, the FPÖ pictured the probable coalition partners on a poster that made them look more like convicts than candidates. The one word title, „Trust?" raised the question of the credibility of a coalition based on a partnership of the same parties that made-up the barely functioning government in Vienna. The subtitle, „control is better" echoed the traditional theme, „power needs control" that was the subtitle for the considerably more photogenic posters of the leading FPÖ candidates.

In addition to general FPÖ themes similar to those identified above as part of the Salzburg campaign, they focused on issues specific to Tyrol, including the unemployment rate, which they claimed was the highest in western Austria, the cost of living which was the highest in the entire country and on specific scandals which had wasted public tax monies. Linser accused Weingartner of having made a lot of noise about the transit problem, but of "having done absolutely nothing." Only the FPÖ had

voted against the treaty under which the problem had grown worse. Although not realistic issues in a state where the FPÖ was certain to remain the third-largest party and without governmental responsibility, the Tyrol-FPÖ also show-cased its proposals for child-care and a flat-tax that were the center-pieces of the campaign in Carinthia and a prelude to the federal election campaign later in the year. These, it argued, could be financed by eliminating waste and corruption in govenment.

Despite their best efforts, Riess-Passer complained that the FPÖ campaign had not attracted much notice, primarily because the ÖVP dominated the local press and because of an ORF policy that neutralized any influence television might have by scheduling the candidates' presentations for 11:30 in the morning. From my impressions, this criticism of the media coverage is accurate. If the FPÖ complained that campaign was buried in the back pages of the newspapers and the dead hours of television coverage, the metaphor became tragically literal when avalanches struck the Paznauntal on 22. February. Weingartner, citing his need to manage the crisis, declared an end to active campaigning and the FPÖ went along out of a stated respect for the dead. The SPÖ candidate urged that a television debate with Weingartner be held as planned, while the other parties tried to woo votes without appearing too aggressive. Political Scientist Fritz Plasser predicted that this might give a „bump" to candidate Weingartner, who as head of government, … could now end the campaign and dedicate himself to crisis management which would be covered by television." Indeed the group MediaWatch quantified the media presence of the candidates during the avalanch crisis and found that no one was mentioned or had any speaking time other than Weingartner who dominated the coverage and may have won sympathy by showing tears on camera as he reported on the progress of the rescue effort. A „market"-Institut poll just a few days before the election confirmed Plasser‘s suspicions:

In an attempt to counter Weingartner‘s omnipresence in the media, FPÖ-Chairman Franz Linser remarked:

The extent to which the avalanches had an impact on the election results is disputed. While a poll conducted for the Tiroler Tageszeitung by the University of Innsbruck found "tradition and stability" to have been decisive for ÖVP-voters, 95 per cent of them denied that the catastrophe had affected their vote. Professors Pelinka and Plasser, both members of the university's political science department, seperately ventured the same opinion, namely that Weingartner's stability and crisis-management had been significant in saving the ÖVP from the significant loss that had been anticipated when the campaign began. The only surprise was the relatively strong improvement of the FPÖ. Projected at the beginning of the campaign only to retain the 16 per cent it had won in 1994, the FPÖ, despite internal upheaval and a tax-scandal involving one of its delegates to the federal parliament, gained 3.6 per cent for a total of 19. 7 per cent , only 2.1 per cent behind the SPÖ, which gained 2 points. The results of the two „voter-stream analyses" that were published, were contradictory, and given the fact that there was no change in the relative standing of the parties and little movement in the overall results of the remaining parties (ÖVP: -.1; Greens: - 1.7; Liberal Forum: -.2) , it is better not to draw any firm conclusions. Although the initial results appeared to cost the Greens two seats in the Landtag, with one each going to the SPÖ and FPÖ, the absolute majority of the ÖVP seemed to have been preserved. Then, however, came allegations that some three hundred ballots had been incorrectly invalidated. In the ensuing recount, the ÖVP lost only .02 per cent, but that was enough to force it to surrender a seat to the Greens and therewith the absolute majority it had held since 1945. In the absence of the proportional representation of all parties in the government, a coalition was necessary. For a time Weingartner appeared ready to go back on his vow never to coalesce with the FPÖ as long as it was headed by Haider, but ultimately and under reportedly heavy pressure from some party colleagues in Tyrol as well as members of the Grand Coalition in Vienna, he formed a government with the SPÖ. The official reason given was that the FPÖ insistance on a seat in government for Susanne Riess-Passer was intolerable because she would operate under "remote control" by Haider from Carinthia where it was expected he would become Landeshauptmann on the strength of the FPÖ victory there.

Haider had been Landeshauptmann once before. In 1989, when the SPÖ lost its absolute majority, the ÖVP jumped at the chance to make a deal with the second-place FPÖ to achieve their mutual goal of denying leadership to the "Reds" for the first time ever. After a little more than two years of a relationship that had proved more difficult and less fruitful than it had anticipated, the ÖVP agreed to support the SPÖ in a vote of no confidence against Haider following his infamous remark about the employment policy of the Third Reich. ÖVP-Chairman, Christoff Zernatto became Landeshauptmann in return for a promise to support the candidate of the party with the most votes after the next election. Evidently, ÖVP distaste for Haider was less than working with the „Reds." Following the 1994 election when the FPÖ picked up two seats and the ÖVP one at the expense of the SPÖ, Zernatto agreed to a deal that would leave him Landeshauptmann, but would give the FPÖ a preponderance of control in the government. In the face of massive disapproval from Haider-enemy, then-Chancellor Franz Vranitzky, as well as Vice-Chancellor and ÖVP-Chairman Eduard Busek and a revolt among some members of his own state party, Zernatto went back on his agreement with the FPÖ and was subsequently elected Landeshauptmann, again with the support of the SPÖ. Haider turned his attention back to federal politics promoting "total opposition" and reasserting his goal of becoming Chancellor by 1998.

Although the FPÖ continued to establish itself as Mittelpartei capable, on occasions, of overtaking one or the other of the old Großparteien, neither an absolute majority nor a coalition that would enable Haider to reach his goal of becoming Chancellor appeared possible. 1997 closed with Chancellor Klima at an all time high in public opinion and a disappointing result for an FPÖ-sponsored initiative against adoption of the Euro left Haider in an evident state of depression. At a New Year's meeting he was critical of the "laxity" shown by some party's functionaries and threatened to resign unless "… enthusiasm again becomes evident. I am not tired. Rather, my weariness is disappointment." When profil questioned FPÖ Landeshauptmann-Stellvertreter Karl-Heinz Grasser about Haider's evident frustration, he responded that his boss wasn't always right and that at this moment he wasn't particularly motivated. Haider responded by dressing down his lieutenant in a six-hour "crisis session" of the state party Leadership. He underscored his commitment to fight against a continuance of the "…SPÖVP-embrace not only at the federal level, but in Carinthia where the election was about which party would be number one." Haider's statement, "that in Carinthia, the strongest team would be presented" for the March 1999 election began speculation that he would be the ticket-leader. Ironically, SPÖ-Chairman Ausserwinkler's statement that he believed the party with the most votes should name the Landeshauptmann probably encouraged Haider to make the move back to Carinthian politics. Ausserwinkler undoubtedly thought that the specter of Haider would galvanize his own splintered party behind him and stem the flow of SPÖ voters to the FPÖ that had recently been the trend most everywhere. Thus, almost a year before the election, the SPÖ became fixated on what became virtually its only campaign theme: "Stop Haider." For his part, Haider remained coy stating that he would not announce his intentions until Fall. This changed however, when, in early June, Karl-Heinz Grasser announced his decision to withdraw from politics to work in the private sector. He stated that the primary reason for his decision was the extraordinary economic opportunity offered him, but added that he had become alienated by "the internal conditions of the party." He named a number of high-ranking fuctionaries as responsible and criticized Haider for not pursuing "... a more constructive course."

Grasser's statement capped a horrible six months for the FPÖ. The January furor in Carinthia had then been followed in short order by crises in Tyrol and Salzburg and the Rosenstingl Affair. When Haider finally announced his decision to head the ticket for the Landtag election, he said that all this had thrown him into such a state of despair that he had actually decided to withdraw from politics. Then, however, "… the general attack on the FPÖ" of which the seduction of Grasser into the private sector by a firm close to the SPÖ was "only a part of a higher strategy, " made him realize that it was "… his responsibility to the voters and citizens to remain constant and keep on." This was an "historic chance" to make the FPÖ the strongest party in Carinthia. "To become Landeshauptmann is the chance to prove that we can govern." To allay any charges that he was just using Carinthia as a stepping-steping stone towards his earlier dream of becoming Chancellor, he promised to serve a full term, as "… as long as the Carinthians want me."

Public opinion polls as campaign was getting underway showed Landeshauptmann Zernatto as distinctly the most popular candidate with 33 per cent, well ahead of Haider with 24 per cent and SPÖ-leader, Michael Ausserwinckler, who had recently dropped from 19 to 15 per cent. Despite Zernatto's personal popularity, his ÖVP was a distant third to the FPÖ and SPÖ which most polls were showing about even, in the 33-35 per cent range. But the SPÖ was in disarray, not the least because of a lack of enthusiasm for its ticket-leader. Michael Ausserwinkler had been a protégé of former Chancellor Vranitzky who had been called to Vienna as Minister of Health. There he made himself thoroughly unpopular for his efforts against public smoking and was then later basically thrust back on the Carinthian SPÖ where he was never really accepted. His relationship with the new Chancellor, Viktor Klima, was cool at best and there were even rumors that a group of SPÖ mayors was trying to dump him as the ticket-leader in the middle of the campaign. A physician by profession, "Auwi" was stiff in public appearances and attempted to soften his image by driving around the state in his "cute," red V-W Beetle to make personal contact with the voters. The Carinthian edition of Kleine Zeitung, described his approach as "süss" in contrast to the "hart" image of the FPÖ conveyed by its advertising line keyed to the rough and tumble game of ice-hockey played in the stadium where its opening rally was to be held. Unmentioned, but implicit was also the tough image that the FPÖ had built through its negative, oppositional politics and emphasis of wedge issues over the past years. The slogan on the poster advertising the rally suggested that if the voters would penalize the SPÖ and ÖVP for their mismanagement and leave them short-handed in the state parliament, then, just as in hockey, the FPÖcould mount a "powerplay" on behalf of the people of Carinthia. Haider's two hour speech opening the Carinthian campaign and outlining the FPÖ line for all the elections in this Superwahljahr, took the usual tough positions against the privileges of politicians, urged protest against the political correctness of the government's cultural policy and warned of the dangers of the expansion of the EU to the East. He ridiculed the government parties in their clumsy efforts to find a compromise between their widely divergent views on reforming the elefantine tax code and announced: "We have the solution." It was a less radical version of a proposal worked out for the FPÖ by Prof. Alvin Rabushka, the U.S. originator of the flat-tax that has been embraced by Steve Forbes and many other

Republicans. Described by one off Haider's most consistent journalistic critics as a "wild idea of American ultra-conservatives," the flat-tax was touted by the FPÖ as a means of bringing significant savings to every income group from workers to entrepreneurs. It would end the unfairness and hopeless complexity of the existing system and, because of a temporary fall in revenue during the phase-in period, it would force government to become more efficient. Capital would be released to the private sector creating an economic boom that would increase employment, reduce welfare costs and, in the long run, even produce higher tax revenues.

In contrast to the hockey motive, another poster advertising the opening rally presented a line that was by no means "hart." The three laughing babies on this poster were thanking Jörg for what they were holding in their hands --- a Kinderbetreuungsscheck This, Haider announced, was the centerpiece of the FPÖ's program to chart a "non-socialist path to renewal." On the back of a campaign handout that looked like a check, Haider promised that if elected Landeshauptmann as a consequence of the outcome of the election on 7. March, "… every woman will receive a ÖS 5700 ($460) monthly for each child from 1 to the age of 6." The reason, he said in his speech opening the campaign, is because "it is no shame when a women receives the right to be with her children. But it is a shame when a policy is pursued that tears children of one or two out of the family. "

In analyzing Haider's reincarnation as a "blauer Softie," profil was probably at least partially correct in presuming "electoral arithmatic," to be the motive. It should not, however, be forgotten that Haider, as spokesman on social matters in his early days in parliament was, in the U.S. use of the term, quite liberal. In an article criticizing Haider's expedient, zig-zag policy in all matters, a conservative defector from the FPÖ described him as "… left of SPÖ-Social Minister Dallinger" at the time. However, since Haider assumed leadership and discovered the power of the right-radical populism, the growth of the FPÖ has been proportionally much greater among men causing the percentage of women in the electorate to sink from about 52 per cent in 1983 to 38-40. In response to the flattening of its growth curve by the mid-nineties, the FPÖ, in its strategy for the Superwahljahr pf 1999, turned to womens' issues. As Haider noted in an interview with profil: "The mistake in 1995 was presenting only 'hart' issues, that we certainly won't do again." The Kinderbetreuungsscheck was to present the "softer side" of the FPÖ and the male-bonding poster "my brother, Jörg and I," illustrates Haider's belief that "on themes such as children, the men will also go along. I don't see any problem with this."

His "powerplay" then, was on behalf of children and their mothers who were " hard-pressed because of their multiple roles." By the week before the election when I arrived on the scene, this "softer side" appreared dominant and the hockey pucks with the party logo that had been given out as campaign gifts in January were replaced by a cuddly "Jörgl Bär."

In the past, critics had attacked FPÖ proposals designed to encourage women to be stay-at-home mothers as reminiscent of the "Kinder, Küche, Kirche slogan of the Nazi era" Understanding that the unenunciated root of this criticism lay in the socialist view of the interrelationship of labor and value, the FPÖ proposed a "Charter for Women," attacking the government for failing to address the higher unemployment and lower wage rates of women. The Kinderbetreuungsscheck was the centerpiece of this agenda and was to go to mothers with children under school-age regardless of whether they chose to stay home and collect the money themselves or use it to pay for child care while they worked. To enthusiastic applause, Haider admitted that the FPÖ believed that it was better for the child and for society that a mother be able to remain at home as long as she could with her small children. Nevertheless, if a mother wanted or needed to return to work, the Kinderbetreuungsscheck would aid her as well. Labeling Ausserwinkler's charge that the program would destroy jobs for Kindergarten teachers "completely absurd, " the FPÖ contended that it would promote the growth of a private, child-care industry and create new jobs. Among other benefits for mothers, the "Womens Charter" urged the expansion of the pension program to include mothers who were left out of the current system because they did not meet the criterion of fifteen years of work outside the home. While the view that these proposals were designed to send women back to the stove was not completely silenced, most of SPÖ criticism focused on what it considered questionable means for financing the schemes. Nevertheless, under this pressure from the FPÖ, family issues rose to the top of the political agenda in Superwahljahr 1999. The ÖVP pushed its proposal for financial support (Karenzgeld) for all mothers, to which the SPÖ responded that this money should only go to those who need it. Seeking to take advantage of this split and perhaps pave the way for a position in government following Federal elections in October, the FPÖ announced that it could work with the ÖVP on this, while taking credit for having initiated the disucsssion.

Another campaign handout was a postcard-sized glossy picture of Haider with "nine good reasons to vote" for him printed on the back. Four of these were common to the other state campaigns:

• reduction of taxes and the bureaucracy.
• opposition to the expansion of the EU, but with a particular emphasis on any

early admission of neighboring Slovenia.

• the flat-tax and other tax incentives to small and middle-sized businesses.
• the need to eliminate patronage and the waste of tax money.

Others were specific to Carinthia:

• the above-mentioned Kinderbetreuungsscheck,
• A promise to improve the standard of living, with a promised reduction in rents as the most specific proposal.
• A promise to reduce the cost of electricity and other fees
• The protection of agriculture and the environment, but not at a cost to the tax-payers. A promise to defend against efforts to divert water from Carinthia to water-poor regions to the south.
• Value should be accorded to Volkskultur; there should be an end to the monopoly over subsides to the arts by the elites of the cultural bureaucracy and an end to subsidies for art that was scornful of traditional values.

A tenth reason, the postcard said, was SPÖ candidate Michael Ausserwinkler, but number one was the person pictured on the front.

The FPÖ campaign relied little on the media and instead concentrated on traditional rallies with free beer, speeches and a lot of handshaking. The nine themes on the postcard were those that Haider emphasized in his speeches at the two rallies I attended. He reminded his listeners that his election ten years ago had ended forty years of rule by the "Reds" and cited a list of changes he had made. But then, he said, collusion between the "Reds" and the "Blacks" had deprived him of the opportunity to make more progress for Carinthia and under his successor, ÖVP-Landeshauptmann Zernatto and his SPÖ enablers, the debt had quadrupled, income had dropped to the lowest in all Austria, there was record unemployment and the health system presided over by Michael Ausserwinkler had come to the edge of collapse. High rent and electricity prices had historically been SPÖ issues, but Haider asked:

This was particularly difficult for single-mothers and young families. Refering to his party's 'Womens Charter," Haider asserted that the solution lay in providing low-cost housing in buildings where the construction costs had already been paid off. "But," he asked rhetorically, "has anyone ever heard of the rents being lowered? No!" The money, instead had gone to Socialist-dominated housing co-ops and for land speculation by banks in the control of one or the other of the coalition parties rather than being returned to the rent-payers. He also asserted that the government had paid too much for loans for new construction just as it had for contracts for electrical production, producing costs that were more than twice as high as in Bavaria The Kinderbetreuungsscheck was enthusiastically received at both gatherings. Haider noted the criticism of the nay-sayers and explained how the program could be financed by diversion of surplus funds from paid-up housing contracts.

Haider also exploited popular anger at the EU on several counts. First, the eastward expansion of the EU, which he accused the coalition parties of favoring, must be stopped. "Schüssel [Foreign Minister] says we must pay thousands of billions of Schillings to prepare these countries for the EU. Nobody says we should take care of our own…" To repeated applause Haider said: "Czechs and Poles work for one-third the wages of Austrians; if they are in the EU they will come in and take the jobs and Austrians will collect unemployment money…. Already, cheap labor from Portugal, Greece and elsewhere in the EU is depressing wages." To deal with this, Haider said, foreigners should be limited to twenty per cent of the labor force in any firm. The EU, which the SPÖVP-government in Vienna had joined via acceptance of what the FPÖ had criticized as the disastrous Maastricht Treaty, was, itself, part of the problem. Haider condemned EU-agricultural policy and excoriated the Minister of Agriculture who was a member of the ÖVP. The FPÖ was not alone in its criticsm Haider noted, reminding his audience of a recent demonstration by farmers in Brussels. To indignant jawohls from the audience, Haider said: "They they were beaten back by the police while the Kurds [whose terrorist organization the PKK was then involved in some violent demonstrations throughout Europe on behalf their leader Abdullah Ocelan] can protest here under the protection of the Socialists without any action being taken against them!"

With regard to culture, Haider elicited ironic laughter from his listeners when he noted that support for childrens' singing clubs had been eliminated. "For that they have no money. But because Herr Ausserwinkler is so enthusiastic about the cultural contributions of Herr Kolig, he gave him ÖS 23,000 ($1849) for a glass walking-stick which he filled with his own urine…. And they call that art. And you pay for that with your tax-money!" All this, Haider said, was due to "Betrayal by 7 years of SPÖVP-Dominance." With an SPÖ loss becoming increasingly apparent, Haider charged, that a move was underway to dump Ausserwinkler as soon as the election was over. Evidence of this was the 13 January meeting between Ausserwinkler's frequent critic and presumed successor, Helmut Manzenreiter and Zernatto. The purpose he guessed was to cook up a deal to divide the term of Landeshauptmann between them regardless of how the election came out. "This, my friends," he said,

Haider's performance at both rallies was masterful. He appeared to know all of the local party functionaries personally, addressed them by their first names and with the du-form He used ihr with with his audiences and they returned the linguistic friendship addressing him as Jörg and with du. He spoke earnestly with many individuals on his way to and from the podium and showed an extraordinary ability to connect with people. This was particularly evident in the case of a young physician who loudly posed an aggressive question after Haider's speech and then followed him into the restaurant where the local functionaries and my group of observers were having lunch following the rally. Haider invited the man to sit down and have something to eat and drink while he explained his perception that that the FPÖ progrm was insufficently attentive to the needs of rural medicine. Haider listened carefully and said he would look into the problems mentioned The man left this encounter apparently won over by Haider.

In many respects, the FPÖ campaign with its demands for lower rents and electricity prices, and money for child-car was almost socialist. The FPÖ admitted this, but pointedly noted that the reason these issues had to be addressed was that the SPÖ, which had held the absolute or relative majority in the land since 1945, had not. The FPÖ campaign was issue-driven, a high road it could afford to follow with polls showing it with a likely plurality in the election. Left with little but the issue of Haider, the SPÖ and the media aligned with it let no opportunity go by with out calling attention to the incidents when Haider had putatively praised "the employment policy of the Third Reich" and "the values of the SS." These were, however, old charges and the Haider whom they targeted was not evident in this campaign. The FPÖ message in the final days of the campaign was that it was "time for a change." Carinthians were urged to initiate "a new phase of political renewal" which was personified by Haider. They were told "whoever wants Haider, must also vote for him" and they did, and in numbers that exceeded even Haider's expectations of 35-37 per cent.

The results brought the FPÖ its highest vote ever. With almost ten per cent less in the popular vote than the FPÖ, the SPÖ lost the majority that it had held since 1945. Nor could Zernatto's supposed popularity and the bonus that has traditionally accompanied incumbency save the ÖVP from its worst-ever showing.

Year	SPOe		FPOe		OeVP		Bund-99		KPOe
	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%	Vote	%
1999	108,469	32.89	138,816	42,09	68,308	23.79	12,895	3.91	1,354	0.41
1994	130,768	37.37	116,419	33,27	83,224	20.71	none	none	none	none
Difference	-22,229	-4.48	22,397	8.82	-14,916	-2.08

The results are even more dramatic when the electoral districts in which the FPÖ won an absolute or relative majority (blue) are seen relative to those won by the SPÖ ( red) and ÖVP (gray).

The "voter-stream analysis" of the SORA-Institut published in profil and Salzburger Nachrichten showed the FPÖ having won approximately 10 per cent of the ÖVP voters from 1994. In agricultural districts that were formerly strongholds of the ÖVP, the FPÖ inroads ran from 8 to 12 per cent. The reason, given in the exit polls was the FPÖ stance against the EU-Maastricht Treaty. Also, the ÖVP lost almost 5 per cent to the FPÖ in the lake district west of the capital city of Klagenfurt where the FPÖ was able to exploit resentment over the failure of the Zernatto government to stem the decline of tourism. Even stronger gains were, however, made at the expense of the SPÖ which lost almost 20 per cent of its 1994 voters to the FPÖ. These gains were registered in industrial centers where there were defections of between 8.7 and 12.2 per cent from the SPÖ and even more impressively in the cities. For former SPÖ voters, the Kinderscheck and promises to lower rents and energy prices seem to have been persuasive. While the SPÖ and OVP were only able to hold 73 and 77 per cent of their 1994 voters respectively, the FPÖ held 90 per cent

Without extensive exit-poll data on voter motives, any comments on why the FPÖ did so well in Carinthia is highly speculative. If, however, election results are a reflection of their campaigns and the public's response to them, then the success seems largely unrelated to right-radical appeal imputed to Haider and his party and summarized at the beginning of this paper.

• Nostalgia for the Third Reich or neo-Nazi sentiment: Aside from the effort of Christa Zöchling, a constantant and bitter critic of Haider in profil, to call attention to the fact that FPÖ did not send representation to commorations of the sixtieth anniversary of Kristallnacht, Haider and the FPÖ gave no further fodder to his critics and the press. Indeed, this is a difficult issue for either of the other major parties to use against the FPÖ in Carinthia. A long-time SPÖ head and Landeshauptmann from 1974-1988 had never denied, nor been hurt by his service as a high-ranking member of the Hitlerjugend and the stridently German-nationalist Kärtner Heimatdienst , which is characterized by the Dokumentationsarchiv as right-extremist, has close ties to the ÖVP.
• German-national issues: Haider's past stance on the German character of Austria and hard-line on bi-lingual education have been important reasons for the enmity of the Linksintellektuellen towards him. In 1988, these would-be defenders of the Carinthian Slovenes protested the passage of legislation by the Federal Parliament on the grounds that it provided too little support for bi-lingual education for Carinthian Slovenes and were constantly critical of Haider as he implemented it during his earlier tenure as Landeshauptmann .

• Demands for the reduction of the social-welfare state and subsidies to the press, literature and the performing arts: The FPÖ campaign, with its emphasis on the Kinderbertruungsscheck, can certainly not be described as either right or extreme. The FPÖ readily admitted that this was an example of one area where big government could be beneficial and limited itself to criticizing SPÖ favoratism, inefficiency and corruption in administering the social-welfare state. Its populism was, however, quite strident in attacking SPÖ cultural policy. Here the assault was against radicalism in art and on behalf of diverting subsidies to cultural programs in the schools and communities which by their nature would be traditional, rather than the experimental and avantgarde projects favored by the Linksintellektuellen.

Some of the FPÖ baggage commonly cited by its critics right-extremist may have indeed played a role, even though unexpressed in the campaign. For example, on one occasion, among people gathering for a rally, I heard some grumbling that the Slovenes were excessive in their bi-lingual demands. "Jörg knows how to take care of them," seemed the concensus. Also unmentioned, as far as I could tell, was the highly controversial traveling exhibit that makes the case that the Wehrmacht must bear a significant share of guilt for the war crimes of the Third Reich that has previously been shoved off on the SS. Haider is highly critical of this Wehrmacht Exhibt and has vigorously opposed the attribution of any blanket guilt to veterans or even to members of the SS unless they were specifically implicated in war crimes. This was the substance of his much-criticized speech to Wehrmacht- and SS-veterans at Krumpendorf in 1995. In contrast, Michael Ausserwinkler sponsored the staging of the exhibit in Carinthia. This exhibit is painful for veterans and even their children and I suspect his sponsorship worked either consciously or unconsciously against him and in favor of Haider among many voters. Having said this, I must also stress that the FPÖ did not try to exploit either issue in the campaign.

It is common, particularly in SPÖ and Green circles, among academics and other intellectuals to see the FPÖ victory in Carinthia as a reflection of this traditional borderland where "the clocks run differently." In contrast to this view that sees Carinthians voting for the FPÖ because they are closet Nazis, I believe that they perceive Haider's politically incorrect interpretations of history to be irrelevant and vote for the FPÖ in protest against an SPÖ-ÖVP-dominated status quo and in defiance of Vienna, profil and the "quality" press, academics, artists and other cultural elites who constantly dredge up what many voters consider to be ancient history. Fritz Plasser, Innsbruck political science professor and respected pollster for the ÖVP, saw the results of the elections as a "habitualized protest," not only in Carinthia but also in Salzburg and Tyrol where the FPÖ, despite serious internal problems, improved its standing as well. A vote for the FPÖ was based on the feeling that neither the formal nor the informal coalitions of ÖVP and SPÖ were working any longer and that it was time for a change. Herbert Dachs of the University of Salzburg agreed that the FPÖ vote was "massively a matter of feelings" and expressed the belief that "finally something has to change." Franz Birk of the IFES-Institut took a similar line emphasizing that in Carinthia it was "a vote for Haider and against frustration" to which could be added Plasser's belief that the focus of both SPÖ and ÖVP on blocking the election of Haider as Landeshauptmann even if the FPÖ were to win the most seats was a serious error. As Haider-intimate Gernot Rumpold put it, "when Manzenreiter tried to make that deal with Zernatto --- that was like Christmas."

The continued growth in electoral support of the FPÖ, slight in Salzburg with all its background problems, and significant in Tyrol, provides evidence to sustain the interpretation that I have developed over the years and have summarized at the beginning of this paper. The interpretations of Plasser, Dachs and Birk cited immediately above support this view. In a previous article I argued that Landtag elections, particularly the three falling together in Salzburg, Tyrol and Carinthia, constituted a trend for subsequent FPÖ growth at the federal level. Whether the elections of 1999 and particularly the election in Carinthia is the breakthrough that I heard FPÖ politicans and partisans talking about at their victory celebration election night in the Klagenfurt Landhaus remains to be seen. On the one hand, the capture of the relative majority by a party other than one of the two that founded the Second Republic was a first and suggests that the FPÖ has moved beyond being just a vehicle for the expression of frustration and protest. The election of Haider as Landeshauptmann on 8. April, is another indication that a corner has been turned in Austrian politics. His election in 1989 represented the first time that a head of government from a party other than the SPÖ or ÖVP had ever been elected, but then the FPÖ was only the second-largest party and needed the positive support of the ÖVP to end what both had styled the permanent dominance of the "Reds." This time, the loss of the voter support for both the SPÖ and the ÖVP was so great that their ticket-leaders resigned leaving Haider as the only candidate for the position of Landeshauptmann who had run for the office. Initially, there was much discussion about blocking the election of Haider. The SPÖ had focused its entire campaign on this promise and ÖVP-Federal Chairman Wolfgang Schüssel had stated that even if the FPÖ were to win the relative majority, Haider would not be elected Landeshauptmann with the help of the ÖVP. Under the circumstances however, these pre-election threats dissolved. Even the SPÖ was divided on what to do, but ultimately nominated its own candidate so as to at least contest Haider's election. The ÖVP was courted by Haider with conciliatory language about common goals that could now be realized and with promises of influence in his government. Confronted with the specter of voter wrath that might bring an absolute majority for the FPÖ in the new elections that Haider had threatened to force should he be denied the fruits of a victory, or the even worse posibility of unleashing him on the entire country as a martyr in the campaign for the federal election in October, the ÖVP backed away from its earlier threats. Technically, it honored Schüssel's promise to not help elect Haider by abstaining from the vote in the Landtag. In reality this was just as good as voting for him since it gave the FPÖ a majority of the votes cast and brought the election of Haider as Landeshauptmann.

Even beyond Carinthia, the election seemed to have effected a sea change in attitide towards Haider and his party. While artists and Linksintellektuellen predictably warned about the dangers of allowing Haider access to power, comentary in the press, even in normally hostile publications such as Standard, and profil, grudgingly acknowledged that the will of the people in Carinthia was for Haider to become Landeshauptmann. Public opinion was less equivocal. According to a poll conducted nationwide for Kurier immediately after the election, 57 per cent supported the election of Haider as Landeshauptmann and 73 per cent of FPÖ voters were sufficiently emboldened by the Carinthian victory to be willing to declare their party preference, up from 50 per cent in 1996. Likewise, the percentage of people who declared themselves absolutely opposed to voting for the FPÖ had dropped from 52 per cent to 38 per cent. An IMAS-poll conducted two weeks later showed similar results: 35 per cent of those questioned said they would be inclined to support participation by the FPÖ in the federal government and 13 per cent they would enthusiastically support such an option against an equal number who were opposed. The FPÖ climbed into a statistical dead-heat with the ÖVP on the question about which party one would support if the election were the next Sunday and Haider climbed 5 points to 37 per cent in the "Politiker-Hitparade" in response to the question: "Of which politician do I have a good opinion." Although light-years behind Viktor Klima at 65 per cent in the popularity contest for Chancellor, Haider, with 14 per cent, nosed out ÖVP-Chairman and Vice-Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel by one point.

Whether this momentum can be sustained is not clear at this writing. In the campaign for the EU-election on 13. June, the FPÖ, as an outspoken opponent of the Maastricht Treaty, stood to benefit from disillusionment over what membership had brought and the corruption scandal in the EU-Commission that broke the week after the March elections. However, with the air war against Serbia raging, the SPÖ, as the party in power benefited from the crisis. Moreover, the SPÖ had steadfastly maintained its commitment to neutrality which has become one of the central pillars of Austrian identity. With NATO bombing Serbia, public opinion against joining NATO soared to almost eighty per cent. Under these circumstances, it is small wonder that the SPÖ gained two percentage points in the EU-election to 31.74 per cent, while the FPÖ, which has argued for NATO membership as a realistic recognition of the end of the Cold War and the new geo-strategic threats to its security, slipped over four points to 23.58 per cent.

Stung by this defeat, the FPÖ announced a shake-up in several areas of its organization and immediately began its campaign for the federal parliament elections to take place on 3. October. Another IMAS-poll conducted in the wake of the EU-elections showed the FPÖ still in a statistical dead-heat with the ÖVP on the so-called "Sunday Question," but with both parties five points below their March levels while the the SPÖ and the pacifist Greens enjoyed a resurgence. Haider's relative absence from the federal political scene also seems to have had an effect on his personal standings in the polls costing him six points in the "Politiker-Hitparade" and dropping him back one point on the Chancellor question, into a tie with Wolfgang Schüssel at 13 per cent. The real test will, of course, come in the parliamentary elections the Sunday before this paper is presented. At that time we will better be able to speculate on the significance of the March elections examined here.

Summary of the Criticisms of Haider

1. Although Haider enjoys what he calls „the blessing of a late birth " on 26. January 1950, that is, well after the end of the Nazi era, his parents had been enthusiastic, although unimportant Nazis.
2. The FPÖ, while adamently denying any desires for another Anschluß to Germany, has always regarded the concept of Austrian nation as ahistorical political correctness. It regards the Austrian experience as part of German history and contends that the overwhelming majority of Austrians belong to the German linguistic, cultural and ethnic community, that is, the German nation in the apolitical, ethno- romantic sense.
3. In 1983, Haider led the Carinthian ticket to the FPÖ‘s only success in the otherwise catastrophic federal election of that year. A substantial reason for his success was his pandering to the discontent of the parents of German-speaking children in the 98 schools where Slovene-German bi-lingual education was mandated. This made Haider the darling of the traditional right-wing of the FPÖ, but also provided ammunition for those who saw German-nationalism as a cover for pro-Nazi nostalgia if not outright neo-Nazism. The following are typically cited by his Haider‘s opponents as evidence.
1. His comment that concept of the Austrian nation was an ideological miscarriage.
2. His comment about the effectiveness of the employment policies by which the Third Reich solved the unemployment problems of the 1930‘s.
3. His use of the term „penal camp" rather than „concentration camp" in a speech otherwise condemning the ethnic extermination policies of the Third Reich.

4. His criticism of „the Lefties of political correctness." Typical in this regard is Haider's September 1995 speech at Krumpendorf where he criticized the controversial Wehrmacht Exhibition that has been traveling throughout Germany and Austria in recent years for creating the impression „… that the members of the war generation, the Wehrmacht, were all criminals. He expressed his party‘s commitment to a future in which the „… older generation will be treated with respect"and to a society in which „order, justice and respect are still principles." This has been widely reported as praise for the values of the SS. This leap by his critics is justified only by the fact that the group to which he was speaking included not only Wehrmacht veterans, but also former members of the Waffen-SS. Haider only compounded the problem when justified his comments on the grounds that „Waffen-SS was a part of the Wehrmacht and that its members were entitled to the honor and recognition of regular army veterans unless it was proven that they had been involved in war crimes.

4. Despite Haider‘s 1995 internal party memorandum decreeing „Schluß mit Deutschtümmelei," his substitute appeal was no more welcome to the literati he dismisses as the „multi-kulti Schicki-Micki." In rejecting „ethno-Romanticism," Haider asserted that the FPÖ had „… developed into the only Austria—conscious and partriotic party in the current party spectrum," as evidenced by its „Austria first" initiative to stop immigration and deal with the negative consequences for public health, education, welfare and housing as well as its opposition to the Maastricht criteria as the basis for entry into the EU.
5. Haider and the FPÖ decry the decline in what they call traditional (read German-Austrian) values. This they see as the result of the dominance of „Multikultis" in the government, the media, artist and intellectual circles and the schools and of the excessive immigration of the past decade. Hoping to parley broad anxiety about the perceived threats posed by the collapse of the Communist system in Eastern Europe and the civil war in Yugoslavia, the FPÖ mounted the „Austria-first" initiative campaign declaring that Austria was not a classic country of immigration and proposing measures to deal with the increased stresses on public health, education, welfare and housing. Led by „Allroundkünstler" Andre Heller, writers, artists and other intellectuals succeeded, along with the governing-SPÖ, in reshaping the initiative in the public mind as a racist, anti-foreigner campaign. Their efforts were crowned by a massive candlelight protest march, symbolically converging on Heldenplatz where Hitler had ceremoniously celebrated the Anschluss of his homeland just short of fifty-five years before.
6. FPÖ wants to substantially reduce the scope of the state, which not only means the paring down of social-welfare benefits, but also its generous subsidies to the press, literature and the visual and performing arts.