The life conditions of Japanese women have been less visible and less subject to systematic examination than men’s in the literature of Japanese studies until recently, though slightly over half of the Japanese population are women. The rise of feminism outside and inside Japan, however, has sensitized observers to gender stratification in Japanese society and directed their attention to a wide range of questions. In what ways are Japanese women subjected to a Japan-specific system of‘ gender control? What kinds of gender barriers exist in Japan’s labor market? How is female sexuality regulated in Japan? How are women disadvantaged in the Japanese family structure? This chapter examines these issues as the most fundamental problems of stratification, arguably more pivotal than other forms of inequality in contemporary Japan. Specifically, we will examine the patriarchal family registration system which is embedded in gender relations and the family system in Japan, the women’s employment situation in the labor market, the issues of sexuality and reproduction, marriage and divorce, and various types of family life.

1  The Family Registration System and le Ideology Beneath Japan’s gender relations and family system lies an elaborate system of registration which penetrates into the life of every Japanese and controls it in a fundamental way. The (family registration) system is the cornerstone of the scheme, representing the usually veiled koseki ura aspect of Japanese family structure. The basic unit of koseki is not an individual but a household. The records of each individual’s gender, birthplace, date of birth, parents’ names, position among siblings, marriage, and divorce are kept in detail in each household koseki and filed in the local municipal office. The concept of family lineage is built into the koseki system. Technically, one can remove one’s name from the current register and establish an independent koseki at any time, but most people do this at the time of marriage. Up to two generations, typically a couple and their children, can be included in a koseki. A three-generation register is legally unacceptable; for example, if grandparents, a married couple and their children live under the same roof, the grandparents must keep their own koseki and the two younger generations keep a separate one. How each individual branched off from a previous koseki register is an important piece of information in the current register. In the hands of organizations the koseki has become a powerful instrument, providing full personal information about their members, as it has become widespread practice for organizations to require potential members to submit a copy of their koseki when they seek membership. Koseki data are required for many other crucial occasions. In the past, companies required job applicants to submit their koseki papers. Minority groups, particularly the buraku activists, vehemently opposed this practice, because the companies were able to discriminate against buraku min whose minority backgrounds were indirectly identified by the papers showing their birthplace and permanent address. While this convention was gradually abolished in the 1970s in response to the protests of buraku movements, the system works as a powerful deterrent to deviant behavior, as “stains” in koseki negatively affect the life-chances of all family members; since each koseki is organized on a household basis, those who acquire a copy can examine the attributes not only of an individual but also of his or her family members.

Supporting the family registration system, a resident card (jumin hyo) system requires each household to register its address and membership with the municipal office of its current place of residence. Accordingly, when a family moves from area A to area B, it must remove its old residence status from the municipal office of area A then report its new address and other family information to the municipal office of area B. In this way, the Japanese government secures detailed information about each household and its history through local governments. The resident card used to contain information identifying the gender, sibling order,and legitimacy status of each child, but the scheme was revised in 1995 in such a way that he or she is now listed simply as “child,” a change which feminist groups had long demanded.

Behind the twin institutions of the family registration system and the residence card system lies the ideology of ie, which literally means house, home, or family but signifies something much more than these English words imply. le represents a quasi-kinship unit with a patriarchal head and members tied to him through real or symbolic blood relationship. In the prewar civil code, the head was equipped with almost absolute power over household matters, including the choice of marriage partners for his family members.  The headship of ie was transferred from one generation to another through primogeniture whereby the first son normally inherited most of the property, wealth and privilege of the household as well as ie headship.  As a general rule, the second and younger sons established their own branch families which remained subordinate to the head family.  For the continuation of ie arrangements, it was not unusual for a family without a son to adopt a boy from a different family. Each ie unit was expected to provide fundamental support for the imperial system.  The post war civil code considerably dismantled the patriarchal system through introducing the general principle of gender equality. However, the ideology associated with the ie system still persists as an undercurrent of family life in Japan, and some of the key ingredients of the ie practice survive in the second half of the twentieth century in the maintenance of the koseki system, which disadvantages women in a number of ways.

The Notion of Household Head The system makes the household the source of information and requires each household to nominate its head.  In reality, nearly all heads are male, some 98 percent of couples who married in 1990 nominated the husband as head of household.  The head is listed at the beginning of the register separately from his individual entry as a member of the household.  His permanent address (honseki) become that of his household, requiring members to assume the same honseki as long as they remain listed in the same register.  When the household head changes his surname for some reason, the members of the household must change their surname in the koseki to match his. Even when the household head dies, his headship continues in his household register as long as other members of the household remain listed in it. Accordingly, in many cases, a widow remains in her husband’s koseki even after his death.  Furthermore, a baby born within the three hundred days of a formal divorce is entered into the koseki of the household head, who is the ex-husband in nearly all cases.  This requirement applies even if he is not the baby’s biological father.  Thus the koseki scheme deters women from divorcing, preserved the male advantages of the patriarca1 order, and protects the ie system in a fundamental way.

2. Children born out of wedlock The koseki system makes a distinction between children born in lawful marriage and those born out of wedlock. For a child of legitimate birth, gender identity and sibling order are designated, for example, by the description “first daughter” or “second son.” However, a child born outside marriage is recorded simply as “child” until the father. acknowledges paternity and marriage occurs. Thus, the family registration scheme categorizes children born in de facto relationships and children not acknowledged by their father as second-class citizens although, as mentioned earlier, the resident card system has removed these distinctions. With respect to inheritance, Japan’s civil code stipulates that the spouse of the deceased is entitled to half the estate, with the remaining half to be distributed equally among the children of the deceased. This is a big change from the prewar code, in which the first son inherited the property and wealth of the household almost exclusively. However, children born out of wedlock are entitled to only half the entitlement of legitimate children. The Tokyo High Court ruled in June 1993 and in November 1994 that this provision or the civil code violates Article 14 of Japan’s constitution, which guarantees equality under the law. Though the government administrative council recommended in 1996 that the stipulation be amended in the next round of the revision of- the civil code, conservative politicians remain cautious about the proposed change on the grounds that it would fundamentally alter the Japanese traditional family system. The koseki system requires births to be recorded on the mother’s family documents even if the child is given up for adoption. Since the system records illegitimate births as a matter of public registration, women often opt for abortion to avoid the social stigma which would result from having an illegitimate child recorded on their official papers. In the late 1980s, a doctor was prosecuted for encouraging women who became pregnant out of wedlock to give birth rather than to have an abortion, and for making arrangements for childless couples to adopt and register as their own children the babies thus born. The case stirred a nationwide debate because, although the doctor’s action was illegal under the family registration law, it was argued that it could be morally justified given the large number of unwed pregnant women who wanted neither to have an  abortion nor to keep a baby born outside marriage. There were also numerous childless families desperate to adopt a baby. The family registration system thus socially penalizes single mothers and their children, thereby serving as a powerful apparatus to preserve the traditional family structure and values.

3 Deterrence to Divorce The family registration system has been an important deterrent to divorce. The divorce rate in Japan has progressively increased since the 1960s, reaching a postwar peak in the early 1980s. However, it has never matched the level recorded in the last quarter of the nineteenth century when couples freely chose to marry or divorce in conformity with their local customs. The highest recorded divorce rate (divorces per one thousand persons) was :5.39 in 1883, while the postwar peak was 1.51 in 1983, exactly one century later. With the enactment of the nationally uniform civil code at the turn of the century and the national consolidation of the koseki system, marriages and divorces became a matter of government regulation and official registration, and the divorce rate in the first half of the twentieth century declined sharply. Though the annual total of divorces has increased in postwar Japan, the divorce rate remains close to the level immediately after World War 11, and is among the lowest recorded inindustrially advanced nations. Economic considerations are, of course, the predominant reason why many women stay in a marriage; those who depend upon their husband financially have little choice but to continue to live with him. In addition to this major constraint, the koseki system puts another restraint upon the possibility of divorce. Divorce requires two separate family registers to be established, and if the couple have had children each child must he shifted into one of the new registers, in most instances the mother’s. Because copies of these papers are often required on such critical occasions as employment and marriage, people can be stigmatized as the children of divorced parents through this public documentation. Fearful of a “tarnish” being placed on their children’s registers, many married couples, particularly women who are deeply involved emotionally in their children’s well-being, vacillate over divorce even when that option is a sensible one. Despite this, some women calculate that the social costs of divorce are less than its positive consequences. On the whole the system serves as a deterrent to divorce, thus buttressing the patriarchal marriage structure.

4 Surname After Marriage The koseki system requires that upon marriage wife and husband take the same surname, which must be one of their former surnames. Thus a married couple may not legally assume different surnames. When Ms Toyota and Mr Suzuki marry, they must both become either Toyota or Suzuki, and one of them must abandon her or his pre-marriage surname. In virtually all cases the woman abandons her surname and is entered into the register of her husband, who is usually listed as the household head. Some women, mainly professionals, choose to use their maiden name as a tsusho (popular name), promote the practice of fufu bessei (different surnames despite formal marriage), and thereby challenge the rigid requirements of the family register system. In the early 1990s, a married female professor attracted national attention because the national university where she taught under her tsusho refused to pay her salary unless she placed a name stamp of her registered surname, or her thumbprint, on salary receipts, arid she took the matter to court, but lost her case. The Ministry of Education uses koseki names on appointments, promotions, and other official documents, regardless of whether women use their maiden names in practice. In many workplaces, koseki names rather than tsusho are listed in internal telephone directories even if female employees use their maiden names in daily interactions with colleagues and clients. In response to calls by women’s groups for a more liberal approach to the surname issue, the governmental administrative council which considered the revision of the civil code recommended in 1996 that a couple should be able to choose an identical surname or different surnames at the time of marriage, when they should also decide whether their children would use their father’s or mother’s surname. According to the recommendation, all children’s surnames must be identical, and those who are already married can assume different surnames upon the agreement of both parties if they report the change within one year of the enactment of the amended code.”

The Family tomb The practice of burial is closely linked with the ie system which functions in tandem with the family registration system. Following the convention of ancestral lineage, most families have family tombs where their ancestors are believed to be entombed. By convention, “descendants” include females who have married male offspring of the family genealogy. Because the koseki system is predicated upon the patriarchal logic that the wife belongs to her husband’s family line as his subordinate, she is usually buried in his family tomb with his ancestors. But increasing interregional mobility, diversified family structure, and land price inflation have induced a substantial number of people, particularly women in urban areas, to reconsider the traditional methods. They object to the custom of family-tomb burial with its close links with ie ideology. Though the family registration system does not dictate where one should be buried, it provides a framework in which the patriarchal system governs women even after death.

6 Seki and Ie In a broader context, the Japanese social system is supported by the notion of seki, the view that, unless one is formally registered as belonging to an organization or institution, one has no proper station in society. As seki pervades Japanese life fundamentally, most Japanese are greatly concerned about which koseki they are registered in and the form their entry takes. Nyuseki (entry into a register) and joseki (exit from a register) are cause for anxiety. ‘The notion of also manifests itself in seki gakuseki (school registry), which is a national student dossier system. After death, one is supposed to be registered in kiseki (the registry of those in the posthumous world). The ie system survives in community life in a visible way. Almost every Japanese household has a nameplate (hyosatsu) on or near its gate or front door. The plate displays the surname of the household, often with the given name of its head. In some cases, the names of all household members are exhibited, with that of the household head first and in slightly larger characters. While aiding postal workers, newspaper deliverers and visitors, these plates serve as a constant reminder that the koseki-style ideology permeates the psyche ofmost Japanese. Though every society has some system of registration - such as electoral rolls, social security numbers, birth and marriage certificates - Japan’s family registration system differs from others in using the household as the unit, packaging a range of information into each koseki, and socially ostracizing those who do not fit into the male-dominated conventional Family structure promoted by the koseki system. This is why de facto relationships are usually kept under the carpet, although de facto couples as well as sexually alternative groups have become more vocal in recent years. The small number of de facto relationships occur mainly among professional women who relish economic independence and good career prospects, and among lower--class women who have little to lose from negative public perceptions. Thus, the understanding of gender relations in Japan requires an in-depth knowledge of the working of the family registration system, which affects all Japanese at every turn of their lives, functioning as an often invisible, but highly effective, way of maintaining patriarchal order.

The images above are of the famous/fabulous onnagata, Bando Tamasaburo from his Spring 2002 one man show.

* from Introduction to Japanese Society by Yosho Sugimoto.

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